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Abstract 
This paper analyses the implications of a continued divergence of TARGET2 balances for monetary policy in the euro 
area. The accumulation of TARGET2 claims (liabilities) would make the ECB’s liquidity management asymmetric once 
the TARGET2 claims in core countries have crowded out central bank credit in those regions. Then while providing 
scarce liquidity to banks in countries with TARGET2 liabilities, the ECB will need to absorb excess liquidity in countries 
with TARGET2 claims. We discuss three alternatives and their implications for absorbing excess liquidity in core regions: 
1) using market-based measures might accelerate the capital flight from periphery to core countries and would add to the 
accumulation of risky assets by the ECB; 2) conducting non-market based measures, such as imposing differential 
(unremunerated) reserve requirements, would distort banking markets and would support the development of shadow 
banking; and 3) staying passive would lead to decreasing interest rates in core Europe entailing inflationary pressure and 
overinvestment in those regions and possibly future instability of the banking system.  
JEL: E42, E52, E58, F32, F36 
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Introduction 
A paper by Sinn (2011b) on the stealthily 
financed current account deficits in the euro area 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) has sparked 
a controversial debate on the offspring, 
development and broader implications of 
TARGET2 (im-)balances.1  Individual TARGET2 
                                                      
1 TARGET2 is the Eurosystem’s real-time gross 
payment (and securities) settlement system. The 
‘Eurosystem’ comprises the ECB and the eurozone’s 
national central banks. 
positions, which are recorded in the balance 
sheets of the Eurosystem’s national central 
banks, began to diverge with the outbreak of the 
financial crisis back in 2007. Until now, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (BB) has accumulated 
claims of more than €300 billion against the 
central banks of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain (hereafter ‘GIPS’).  2 | ABAD, LÖFFLER & ZEMANEK  
Sinn (2011a and 2011b) argues that such 
imbalances are the reflection of an interim and 
secret bailout by the ECB of the countries 
grouped under the ‘GIPS’ acronym. By 
increasing BB’s claims over time, the GIPS’ net 
imports (Greece’s in particular) net imports are 
being supported and intra-euro current account 
imbalances are being perpetuated (current 
account view). However, as Buiter et al. (2011) and 
Bindseil & Koenig (2011) note, TARGET2 
imbalances are just the result of capital 
movements between each pair of countries 
settled through the Eurosystem’s payment 
clearing system (financial account view). The 
policy relevance gained by the TARGET2 
mechanism stems from the disruption and 
prolonged malfunctioning of interbank funding 
markets in Europe.  
Since the financial crisis started, a number of 
national banking systems (Irish, Greek and 
Portuguese banks in particular) have been 
progressively excluded from the interbank 
lending markets over growing concerns about 
their solvency. The Eurosystem had to step in as 
a market-maker, providing unlimited lending to 
GIPS’ banks. TARGET2 (im-)balances began 
reflecting GIPS’ net capital outflows as 
refinanced by the Eurosystem. Note that only the 
Irish banking system has lost about €140 billion 
of foreign deposits since 2007, with German 
banks becoming the main beneficiaries of capital-
repatriating flows currently underway. 
Furthermore, TARGET2 balances will keep 
diverging for as long as foreign (and even 
domestic) bank deposits in crisis countries are 
transferred to other banking systems that are 
perceived as safer by depositors. 
In this context, Sinn & Wollmershäuser (2011) 
argue that the total stock of central bank money 
poses a hard limit to TARGET2 (im)balances. 
However, we show that – far from being any 
hard limit – TARGET2 balances might be 
unlimited. That said, further extensions of 
TARGET2 claims (liabilities) in the euro area’s 
core (peripheral) economies might be at odds 
with maintaining a common monetary policy 
within the currency union.  
Increasing BB’s TARGET2 claims above 
autonomous liquidity demand2 would lead to 
                                                      
2 Autonomous liquidity demand is equivalent to the 
sum of autonomous liquidity absorbing factors on the 
excess liquidity in Germany (as well as in other 
TARGET2-creditor countries), which – as we will 
see – would pose a threat to the ‘common’ nature 
of monetary policy in the euro area. It should be 
noted that, in order to maintain a single interest 
rate for the whole union, the ECB needs to 
provide liquidity to banks in the GIPS countries 
(TARGET2 debtors) while simultaneously 
absorbing excess liquidity from the eurozone’s 
core countries (TARGET2 creditors). In this 
paper, we look at the different alternatives for 
liquidity management within the euro area and 
show that policy-making might become quite 
uncomfortable for European central bankers.  
1.  The ECB as a market-maker of last 
resort ... or how target2 is financing 
intra-euro area capital flights 
In order to draw a stylized picture of how 
TARGET2 is supporting capital flights, we 
assume the euro area as a currency union 
consisting of two countries – Germany and 
Ireland. Before the crisis, the German banking 
system massively accumulated foreign claims – 
in our two country world – against Irish banks, 
therefore playing an active role in the build-up of 
the Irish boom. However, the financial crisis 
brought the boom to a sudden end. German 
investors’ risk-aversion (against Irish assets) 
increased and German financial institutions 
started to repatriate their investments. Funds 
started to leave Ireland and flow back into 
Germany. Figure 1 shows the balance sheets of 
the Irish and the German banking systems. Until 
the crisis, the increase of the Irish banking 
system’s balance sheet was mainly driven by 
foreign deposits, which were used to finance 
investments both inside and outside Ireland. 
With the outbreak of the 2007-08 financial crisis, 
this funding source started to decline, especially 
in the second half of 2010 (see upper panel of 
Figure 1). In Germany this development was 
mirrored (in absolute terms) by a rise in foreign 
claims before the crisis and its reversal after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers (see lower panel of 
Figure 1).  
                                                                                          
liability side of the central banks balance sheet. This – 
in case of the BB – is mainly explained by currency in 
circulation, see ECB (2011, p. 115). TARGET2 UNLIMITED | 3 
 
Figure 1. Banking system balance sheets 
Irish banking system 
 
German banking system 
 
Sources: National central banks, IMF and IFS. 
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Figure 2. Financing of intra-euro area capital flight via the TARGET2 
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In a world without a lender of last resort, the 
‘bank run’ on Irish banks triggered by the flight 
of foreign (German) deposits would have ended 
up with the collapse of the Irish banking system 
while, in Germany, banks would have realised 
massive losses as the capital flight would have 
been limited by the sequential-service 
constraint.3 Not so within the Eurosystem: since 
the start of the financial crisis, Irish banks have 
been progressively excluded from interbank 
lending as German banks reduced their exposure 
to them on the back of concerns over their 
                                                      
3 Due to term transformation, only the first-movers 
would have saved their deposits. That was the case of 
Iceland, where, as capital left the country, many 
‘slow’ foreign investors based in the UK and the 
Netherlands lost theirs.   
solvency. The ECB had to act as a ‘market-maker 
of last resort’ in order to avoid a potential 
systemic event. The TARGET2 system 
guaranteed Irish banks unlimited4 credit lines 
from other Eurosystem central banks at the 
ECB’s refinancing rate, eliminating the 
sequential-service constraint for German banks. 
Figure 2 above shows the dynamics of the 
TARGET2 mechanism and the flight of German 
capital out of Ireland (flowing back into 
Germany).5 Firstly, German banks reduce their 
exposure to Ireland. Foreign claims (item 1) of 
the German banking sector are declining, 
                                                      
4 Conditional on Irish banks providing sufficient 
collateral. 
5 A broadly similar approach is described in Buiter et 
al. (2011) and Bindseil & Koenig (2011). 
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mirroring a reduction of foreign liabilities in the 
Irish banking sector’s balance sheet (item 2). 
While also reducing their domestic and foreign 
claims, Irish banks fill the gap left by the 
reduction in (foreign) financing sources by (over-
)relying on central bank credit (item 3). As a 
result, open market operations increase (item 4) 
in the asset side of the Bank of Ireland’s (BOI) 
balance sheet, and a similar increase in 
TARGET2 liabilities (item 5) follow. As the ECB 
intermediates the transfer of bank deposits – via 
TARGET2 – to the BB, the ECB’s TARGET2 
liabilities to BB increase (item 7).6 In its turn, BB 
books TARGET2 outflows among its assets (item 
8) and credits the proceeds on the account of the 
recipient German bank (item 9). The German 
banking system, whose claims on the central 
bank have increased (item 10) now holds 
liquidity in excess of their reserve requirements. 
                                                      
6 There is no ‘world’ liquidity effect as TARGET2 
claims and liabilities sum up to zero at the ECB level.  
In order to minimise low-remunerated ‘excess’ 
liquidity (item 10), German banks reduce their 
reliance on refinancing operations at the BB (item 
11), which is equivalent to declining claims of BB 
on German banks (item 12) and a reduction of 
liquidity (item 9).  
The stylized chart of liquidity flows diagrammed 
in Figure 2 shows up in the balance sheets of 
both the BOI and BB (Figure 3). Since the start of 
the crisis, claims on Irish banks (as well as 
TARGET2 liabilities in the BOI balance sheet) 
have sharply increased. This increase has been 
mirrored by an increase of TARGET2 claims 
(substituting previous claims on German banks) 
in the BB’s balance sheet. 
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Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
Sources: National central banks, IMF and IFS. 
2.  Unlimited TARGET2 balances – 
The emergence of creditor and 
debtor central banks 
According to Sinn & Wollmershäuser (2011), the 
resulting increase in TARGET2 liabilities (claims) 
at the BOI (BB) would crowd central bank credit 
out in Germany (see items 8 and 12 in Figure 2 
and the horizontal dashed area substituting the 
black area in the lower panel of Figure 3). While 
this situation might be possible, the implications 
that Sinn & Wollmershäuser (2011) derive are 
not straightforward. They argue that the 
Eurosystem would need to sell its reserves (gold 
and foreign exchange) when the supply of 
liquidity due to the accumulation of TARGET2 
claims exceeding autonomous liquidity 
demands. While theoretically possible, it is not 
very likely. Instead, the BB would (be inclined 
to) absorb liquidity by issuing debt instruments 
that would be recorded on its balance sheet’s 
liability side. 
However, this – in our view – more realistic 
scenario would lead to a paradoxical situation. In 
general, a textbook central bank holds a 
monopoly over the issuance of base money and 
provides liquidity wherever it is scarce at the 
policy rate (creditor central bank). In contrast, due 
to the accumulation of large stocks of foreign 
reserves, most emerging market central banks 
are facing surplus liquidity in their domestic 
banking systems (debtor central bank). By 
expanding longer-term liabilities to the domestic 
banking system, debtor central banks 
structurally absorb liquidity (Loeffler et al., 
2010).  
The increase of TARGET2 claims above liquidity 
demand at the BB would have a similar effect to 
the accumulation of FX reserves in emerging-
market central banks. In fact, the BB would 
become a debtor central bank towards the 
German banking system! At the same time, 
national central banks building up TARGET2 
liabilities – such as the BOI – would remain as 
classical creditor central banks. That is, while the 
ECB would need to provide liquidity to one 
region of the euro area, it would also have to 
reduce liquidity in countries with TARGET2 
claims. As a result, liquidity management in the 
euro area would become asymmetric.  
To get a sense of how the balance sheets of 
creditor (BOI) and debtor central bank (BB) 
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would differ, Figure 4 zooms into Figure 2 for 
that purpose. With constant liquidity demand in 
Germany, the continued increase of TARGET2 
claims would lead to an oversupply of liquidity. 
In order to absorb the excess liquidity, BB would 
have to offer debt instruments to German banks 
(item 13). In contrast, the BOI would have to 
expand its open market operations on the asset 
side of its balance sheet in order to meet the 
increasing liquidity needs of the Irish banking 
system. 
Figure 4. The emergence of creditor and debtor central banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Liquidity management in an 
asymmetric monetary union 
In light of these developments, the ECB will face 
three major alternatives for managing the excess 
liquidity we have already analysed in our 
stylized 2-country monetary union. Firstly, the 
Eurosystem take market-based measures such as 
selling bonds to German banks or using reverse 
repos to drain excess liquidity in the German 
banking system. Secondly, it could absorb excess 
liquidity through non-market-based instruments 
such as an increase in (unremunerated) 
minimum reserve requirements. Thirdly, the 
Eurosystem could (do nothing and) just offer 
German banks access to the ECB’s deposit 
facility, which is remunerated at 0.5%, that is,  75 
basis points below the marginal lending rate 
(currently at 1.25%).7 
3.1  Market-based liquidity drain  
In order to encourage German banks to invest in 
longer-term central bank debt, the Eurosystem 
could offer reverse repos at an interest rate close 
                                                      
7 There is a fourth alternative, which is ‘fiscal 
coordination’. Fiscal authorities might move bank 
deposits to the central bank. In this case, government 
deposits would become quasi-monetary policy 
operations for as long as the central bank is able to 
keep withdrawals under control. The mixture of fiscal 
debt management and monetary policy would call 
into question the ‘independence’ of the central bank at 
stake. 
to the main refinancing rate. If excess liquidity is 
completely absorbed, this option would ensure a 
common monetary policy within the eurozone as 
short-term rates would remain close to one 
another in all member countries. However, two 
main unintended consequences are likely to 
follow. Firstly, capital flight would likely 
accelerate as the TARGET2 mechanism would 
provide an incentive for German banks to 
withdraw their foreign deposits from Irish 
financial institutions and invest them into high-
yield central bank debt. The implications would 
be that German banks would be encouraged to 
even accelerate their disengagement in Ireland as 
the Eurosystem – due to the TARGET2 
mechanism – would de facto swap the risky 
exposure of German banks toward the Irish BS 
into riskless high-yielding claims against their 
central bank. Secondly, issuing debt certificates 
at the policy rate could complicate liquidity 
management and discourage interbank lending 
as banks could overdemand liquidity knowing 
that, at the end of the day, they could reinvest it 
in market-based central bank debt at the policy 
rate.8     
Figure 5 describes this mechanism. ‘Private 
liquidity’ flows via the TARGET2 system back to 
                                                      
8 Under ‘normal’ conditions, an over-demand for 
liquidity is not ‘costless’ as lending the excess 
liquidity in the interbank market would lead to a 
downward pressure on interbank rates, while 
reinvesting it in central bank debt would be possible 
only at the deposit interest rate. 
      Deutsche Bundesbank (BB) 
Assets  Liabilities 
Target2 ↑ 
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    Bank of Ireland (BOI) 
Assets  Liabilities 
Claims on  
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Target2 ↑ 
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Germany leading to an increased demand on 
‘central bank liquidity’ by Irish banks, which 
have to pay the policy rate for their increased 
reliance over Eurosystem lending. German banks 
are encouraged to remove their deposits as they 
can invest their repatriated deposits with the 
Eurosystem yielding at least the policy rate.  
Figure 5. Free lunch for German banks 
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While claims against the Eurosystem (reverse 
repos) are riskless,9 funds deposited at Irish 
banks are (perceived as) much riskier.10 The 
Eurosystem as a whole would be accumulating 
riskier assets as a by-product of its monetary 
policy operations with the Irish banks (lower 
part of Figure 5). The default risk of holding such 
riskier assets posted as collateral by Irish banks 
would be borne by the ECB and, ultimately, by 
the individual national central banks in 
accordance to their capital key. Overall, this first 
option would represent a ‘free lunch’ for the 
German banking sector. 
3.2  Non-market based liquidity drain  
In order to absorb excess liquidity in the German 
banking system, the Eurosystem could also 
impose differential unremunerated required 
reserves (DeGrauwe, 2010). In contrast to 
market-based measures in which banks are free 
                                                      
9 In order to ensure the attractiveness of those 
investments, the default risk would have to remain at 
the ECB. 
10 Note that, while it could be argued that ‘deposit 
insurance’ makes deposits risk-free, this depends – in 
its turn-on the government’s creditworthiness. Once 
this is lost, concerns over the higher risk of funds 
deposited at domestic institutions would be justified. 
to invest on their own initiative, minimum 
reserve requirements are imposed by legal force. 
An increase of unremunerated11 required 
reserves on German banks would force them to 
increase their deposits at the Eurosystem.12 BB’s 
longer-term liabilities to the German BS (item 13 
in Figure 4) would increase and – therefore – the 
(over)supply of liquidity would fall.  
The very serious drawbacks of absorbing 
liquidity by legal force are at least two-fold:  
1.  Mixing up interest rate policies with 
quantity restrictions would probably 
induce higher interest rate volatility as 
monetary policy can only choose between 
two instruments: either targeting prices 
(interest rates) and leaving quantities to 
                                                      
11 Currently, minimum reserves in the Eurosystem are 
remunerated by the average interest rate of the ECB’s 
main refinancing operations during a month. 
Therefore, although banks are not free to invest in 
required reserves, an increase in remunerated reserve 
requirements would have a similar impact as that of 
using market-based measures to absorb surplus 
liquidity.  
12 In practice, minimum reserve requirements would 
need to be increased in all euro area countries that are 
interconnected with the German banking system 
through the interbank market. 
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react endogenously or targeting quantities 
and accepting an endogenous 
determination of prices. Therefore, 
minimum reserve requirements would not 
be able to absorb peaks of excess liquidity 
without causing extreme interest rate 
swings in the interbank market.13  
2.  As reserve requirements are not 
mandatory for all financial institutions, but 
just for depository banks, the quasi-tax 
nature would hinder fair competition. In 
this case, monetary policy would support 
the emergence of unregulated financial 
products and institutions. 
3.3  Deposit facility – No active 
liquidity drain 
This option – in our view, the most likely one – 
would be equivalent to a decrease of the money 
market interest rate in Germany. Since Irish 
banks are virtually excluded from the euro 
interbank lending market, excess liquidity in the 
German banking system would lead – due to the 
lack of alternative investment opportunities with 
a better risk-return profile – to additional 
pressure on short-term interest rates. 
                                                      
13 Managing liquidity through reserve requirement 
adjustments has sometimes been compared to cutting 
a diamond with a sledgehammer. The ECB’s required 
reserve ratio is 2% of overnight deposits as well as 
deposits and debt securities with a maturity up to 2 
years and has not changed since the beginning of 
EMU. 
Interbank interest rates would fall to the 
Eurosystem’s overnight deposit rate,14 currently 
75 basis points below the main financing rate 
(Figure 6). At this rate, banks would be 
indifferent between investing their excess of 
liquidity with other commercial banks and 
investing it in the Eurosystem’s riskless deposit 
facility. Thus, building on the deposit facility, the 
effective money market rate would be higher in 
crisis countries – like Ireland – than in the boom 
ones – like Germany.  
Apart from not being in line with a common 
monetary policy, the ‘do-nothing’ option would 
foster overinvestment in Germany. In order to 
avoid investing the ‘free’ liquidity into the low-
yielding deposit facility, German banks would 
have the incentives to search for higher-yielding 
investment projects. Inflationary pressures, 
together with the usual hazards associated with 
excessive and/or riskier lending in Germany, 
would be two likely outcomes. However, there is 
also a point in favour of the deposit facility 
solution. The lack of investment opportunities 
could also discourage German banks from 
removing their foreign deposits.15 That would 
lower the pressure on the TARGET2 mechanism 
as well as on monetary policy. 
                                                      
14 The overnight deposit rate is the relevant policy rate 
in an environment of excess liquidity.  
15 That would also be the case when excess liquidity is 
absorbed using the non-market based option.  
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4.  Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the implications of an 
ongoing divergence of TARGET2 balances for 
monetary policy in the euro area in the case of a 
prolonged capital flight from the periphery to 
core countries. We show that the ‘common’ 
nature of monetary policy within the eurozone 
could be called into question if TARGET2 claims 
lead to rising liquidity in the core regions. 
Should that be the case, the Eurosystem would 
need to provide liquidity to banks in countries 
with TARGET2 liabilities while absorbing excess 
liquidity in countries with TARGET2 claims to 
maintain a common interest rate for the euro 
area.  
The strategies available at hand for absorbing 
excess liquidity are limited and neither of their 
outcomes will be optimal from the Eurosystem’s 
perspective. Using liquidity-absorbing market-
based measures might even accelerate the capital 
repatriation process and would provide core 
banks with a ‘free lunch’. Imposing 
unremunerated reserve requirements on core 
banks might hamper (or even break) the interest-
rate transmission channel and encourage the 
emergence of shadow banking. Finally, even a 
‘do-nothing’ scenario would likely cause 
inflationary pressures, together with the hazards 
associated with excessive and/or riskier lending 
in core countries.  
Whether a credit-driven boom in core Europe’s 
domestic economies would provide a way out of 
the current crisis remains uncertain. By driving 
an overinvestment cycle in core Europe (in 
particular in Germany), GDP growth and asset 
prices would pick up. Domestic demand would 
start rising possibly with positive spillover 
effects to periphery countries. The boom would 
improve the asset side of German banks’ balance 
sheets so their restructuring would also be 
quicker. A likely increase of liquidity demand by 
German banks could lead to a reduction of 
excess liquidity, although it could also accelerate 
the deposit drain to fund investments in 
Germany. Overall, relying on a bubble for 
boosting short-term growth would be sowing the 
seeds of the next crisis. 
The best scenario we can conceive of is one in 
which TARGET2 balances do not infinitely 
diverge. However, to reach that goal, the euro 
area interbank money market would need to be 
fully restored so as to improve the liquidity 
allocation process. Since this cannot be safely 
achieved by the usual stabilisation policies at 
hand, we urge policy-makers to speed up the 
restructuring process currently underway in 
many European banking sectors and to meet the 
fiscal consolidation targets in place to regain the 
trust of financial markets.   
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